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Abstract— This poster will describe the security problems of
the emerging vehicular networks. It will also outline the solution
architecture and several of its components.
I. INTRODUCTION
Vehicular networks will enable a variety of applications for
safety, traffic efficiency and driver assistance, and infotain-
ment. For example, warnings for environmental hazards (e.g.,
ice on the pavement) or abrupt vehicle kinetic changes (e.g.,
emergency breaking), traffic and road conditions (e.g., conges-
tion or construction sites), and tourist information downloads
will be provided by these systems.
Vehicular networking protocols will allow nodes, that is,
vehicles or road-side infrastructure units, to communicate with
each other over single or multiple hops. In other words, nodes
should act both as end points and routers, with vehicular
networks emerging as the first commercial instantiation of the
mobile ad hoc networking technology.
The self-organizing operation and the unique features of
vehicular networks are a double-edged sword: a rich set of
tools are offered to drivers and authorities, but a formidable set
of exploits and attacks becomes possible. Hence, the security
of vehicular networks is indispensable, because these systems
can make anti-social and criminal behavior easier, in ways that
will actually jeopardize the benefits from their deployment.
Securing vehicular networking protocols is a hard problem,
its solution involves both the industry, governments, and the
academia, and can have a broad impact.
Our research focuses on the design and building of secure
vehicular networking protocols and systems. We are closely
collaborating with other academic and industrial partners
within SEVECOM (SEcure VEhicular COMmunications),
a new EU-funded project that focuses on providing a full
definition and implementation of security requirements for
vehicular communications.
In the rest of this proposal, we outline vulnerabilities and
challenges, the security architecture we propose, and open
research problems. More information on this topic can be
found at http://ivc.epfl.ch and http://www.sevecom.org.
II. VULNERABILITIES AND CHALLENGES
A. Vulnerabilities
Any wireless-enabled device that runs a rogue version of
the vehicular communication protocol stack poses a threat.
We denote such rogue devices deviating from the definition
of protocols as adversaries or attackers. Next, we explore the
most significant vulnerabilities of vehicular communications.
Jamming The jammer deliberately generates interfering
transmissions that prevent communication. Since the network
coverage area, e.g., along a highway, can be well-defined,
at least locally, jamming is a low-effort exploit opportunity:
an attacker can relatively easily, without compromising cryp-
tographic mechanisms and with limited transmission power,
partition the vehicular network.
Forgery Fig. 1 illustrates the fast ’contamination’ of large
portions of the vehicular network coverage area with false
information: a single attacker forges and transmits false hazard
warnings (e.g., ice formation on the pavement), which are
taken up by all vehicles in both traffic streams.
In-transit traffic tampering Any node acting as a relay
can disrupt communications of other nodes: it can drop or
corrupt messages, or, meaningfully modify messages. This way
the reception of valuable or even critical traffic notifications
or safety messages can be manipulated. Moreover, attackers
can replay messages, e.g., to illegitimately obtain services.
Impersonation Message fabrication, alteration, and replay
can also be used towards impersonation. Consider, for exam-
ple, an attacker masquerading an emergency vehicle to mislead
other vehicles to slow down and yield. Or, an adversary
impersonating roadside units, spoofing service advertisements
or safety messages.
Privacy With vehicular networks deployed, the collection
of vehicle-specific information from overheard vehicular com-
munications will become particularly easy. Then, inferences on
the drivers’ personal data could be made, and violate her or
his privacy. Fig. 2 illustrates an eavesdropping attacker (which
could even be a service provider), with ’strength’ quantified
by the number of network traffic sniffing points. The attacker
extracts data such as time, location, vehicle identifier, technical
descriptions, or trip details, and based on those derive private
information.
On-board tampering Beyond exploits of communication
protocols, the attacker may select to tinker with data (e.g.,
velocity, location, status of vehicle parts) at their source.
Tampering with the on-board sensing and other hardware (e.g.,
real-time clocks), may, in fact, be relatively simple.
B. Challenges
The operational conditions, the constraints, and the user
requirements for vehicular networks make security a hard
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problem, facing a number of challenges specific to vehicular
networks; the most significant ones are discussed next.
Highly transient associations The associations among
nodes can quite often be highly transient and almost once-in-
a-lifetime. Two vehicles (nodes) traveling on a highway may
remain within their transceiver range, or within a few wireless
hops, only for few seconds. This means that techniques ap-
propriate for other types of networks, which allow long-lived
associations, or user contact, or need to communicate only
with few end-points, can be impractical for securing vehicular
networks.
Liability vs. Privacy To make the problem harder, ac-
countability, and eventually liability, of the vehicles and their
drivers is required. Vehicular communication is envisioned as
an excellent opportunity to obtain data that can assist legal
investigations (e.g., in the case of accidents). This implies
that unambiguous identification of the vehicles should be
possible, as sources of messages. Moreover, context-specific
information, such as coordinates, time intervals, and associated
vehicles, should be possible to extract or reconstruct. But such
requirements raise even stronger privacy concerns.
Real-time communication Many of the envisioned safety
and driver-assistance applications pose strict deadlines for
message delivery or are time-sensitive. This means that se-
curity protocols should impose low processing and messaging
overhead, and be robust to clogging denial of service attacks.
Vehicular Network Scale With roughly a billion vehicles
around the globe, and a multitude of authorities governing
transportation systems, the design of a facility that provides
cryptographic keys is significant challenge. Especially because
vehicles’ communication essentially has no administrative
boundaries.
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III. SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we present the components needed to protect
vehicular networks against a wide range of threats. Fig. 3
depicts the general architecture, the components of which are
described next.
A. Security hardware
Among the vehicle onboard equipment, two hardware mod-
ules, namely the Event Data Recorder (EDR) and the Tamper-
Proof Device (TPD), will be dedicated to security.
The EDR will be responsible for recording the vehicle’s crit-
ical data, such as position, speed, time, etc., during emergency
events, similarly to a plane’s black box. It will also record
all the received safety messages during these events. This
data will help in accident reconstruction and the attribution of
liability. The EDR must be tamper-proof; EDRs are already
installed nowadays in many road vehicles, especially trucks.
The car electronics can be easily tampered due to their
easy accessibility (e.g., by the owner or a mechanic). This is
why the cryptographic keys of a vehicle need proper hardware
protection, namely a TPD. The TPD will take care of storing
all the cryptographic material and performing cryptographic
operations, especially signing and verifying safety messages.
The TPD can also include its own clock and battery that is
periodically recharged from the vehicle’s electric circuits.
B. Vehicular Public Key Infrastructure
The huge number of vehicles (there are over 750 million
vehicles worldwide today), registered in different countries
and traveling long distances well beyond their initial regis-
tration region, requires a robust and scalable key management
scheme. The involvement of authorities in vehicle registration
implies a certain level of centralization. Hence the need for a
Certificate Authority
100 - 200 bytes 100 - 600 bytes
Safety 
message Cryptographic material
{Position, speed, 
acceleration , direction, 
time, safety events }
{Signer’s DS , Signer’s 
PK, CA’s certificate of 
PK}
Authenticated 
message
Data correlation
Secure positioning
Tamper-
proof device
Event data 
recorder
Secure multihop routing
Services  (e.g., toll 
payment or 
infotainment )
Fig. 3. Overview of the security architecture
Vehicular Public Key Infrastructure (VPKI), where Certificate
Authorities (CAs) will issue certified public/private key pairs
to vehicles (with many pairs per vehicle for privacy reasons
as will be explained in Section III-D). Similarly to current
vehicle registration authorities, there will be several CAs,
each corresponding to a given region (e.g., country, state,
metropolitan area, etc.). Other candidates for taking the role
of CAs are car manufacturers. In either case, the different CAs
will have to be cross-certified so that vehicles from different
regions or different manufacturers can authenticate each other.
This will require that each vehicle stores the public keys of
all CAs whose certificates it may need to verify.
C. Authentication
The fundamental security functions in vehicular networks
will include authentication of the origin of data packets,
to solve the in-transit traffic tampering and impersonation
attacks. To achieve this, vehicles will sign each message with
their private key and attach the corresponding certificate. Thus,
when another vehicle receives this message, it verifies the key
used to sign the message and once this is done correctly, it ver-
ifies the message. The drawbacks of asymmetric cryptography
show up in this basic authentication operation. In fact, using
ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography), the most compact public
key cryptosystem so far, the estimated security overhead of the
signature and certificate is around 140 bytes. But it is possible
to reduce this overhead by signing only critical messages. In
addition, given the frequency of safety message broadcasts
(typically, every 300 ms), a vehicle could ignore redundant
messages.
D. Privacy
To conceal the vehicle’s identity, we propose using a set
of anonymous keys that change frequently according to the
driving speed. These keys are preloaded in the vehicle’s TPD
for a long duration, for example, until the next yearly checkup.
Each key is certified by the issuing CA and has a short lifetime
(e.g., a specific week of the year). In addition, it can be tracked
back to the real identity of the vehicle (the Electronic License
Plate, ELP) in case law enforcement necessitates this and only
after obtaining a permission from a judge. This conditional
anonymity will help determine the liability of drivers in the
case of accidents. The downside of this approach is the storage
space needed for the set of anonymous keys to be used during
a whole year; nevertheless, this is feasible with relatively small
hard drives (a few Mbytes).
E. Secure positioning
In vehicular networks, position is one of the most important
data for vehicular communication protocols and applications.
Each vehicle needs to know not only its own position, but
also those of other vehicles (e.g., those involved in accidents or
traffic jams). Hence, the correctness of positioning information
is crucial. GPS is well known to function poorly in microwave
signal attenuating environments, such as high building areas,
tunnels, valleys, and in some cases bad weather (e.g., when
there is a thin film of water on the receiver’s antenna). All
these factors lead to the conclusion that GPS positioning
information cannot be totally trusted. Moreover, vehicles can
intentionally lie about their positions. Hence the need for a
secure positioning system that will allow vehicles to correctly
determine their own as well as other vehicles’ positions.
IV. OPEN PROBLEMS
There remains a set of unexplored problems directly related
to vehicular network security:
Secure routing: the basic safety message dissemination
model in vehicular networking consists in local broadcasting
of regular or event warning messages. But there are scenarios
when messages need to be delivered to specific areas, e.g.,
to the end of a traffic jam queue so that arriving vehicles
have the option of taking another route before getting stuck.
In vehicular networks, this can be supported by the geocast
primitive that is a form of position-based routing protocols. Yet
none of these solutions is secure. But there is rich literature on
topology-based secure routing protocols whose applicability to
vehicular networks still needs to be investigated.
Data verification helps to prevent the forgery attack.
This can be achieved by a data correlation mechanism that
compares all collected data regarding a given event. Such
mechanisms still have to be designed.
DoS resilience: DoS attacks, and especially jamming, are
relatively simple to mount yet their effects can be devastating,
bringing down the whole network. Existing solutions like
frequency hopping do not completely solve the problem. The
use of multiple radio transceivers, operating disjoint frequency
bands, can be a feasible approach.
